



Sheikha Shamma Bint Mohammed Bin Khalid Al Nahyan

**Political & Social Security in the Arabian  
Gulf Region and United Arab Emirates  
After the Second Gulf War**

External and Internal Challenges

Studies on International Issues **B 05**

RESEARCH CENTER OF THE SLOVAK FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION



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## *Editor's note*

This publication is possible thanks to the kind permission given by H.E. Sheikha Shamma Bint Mohhamed Bin Khalid Al Nahyan of the Abu Dhabi Emirate. The text has been originally written as a part of the Sheikha Shamma Al Nahyan's thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the Comenius University in Bratislava. Sheikha Shamma Al Nahyan successfully defended Her Ph.D. thesis in May 2000. The first book edition of the dissertation was published in 2000 by the Ousha Bint Hussein Cultural Rewaq Center in Dubai. I would like to express my thanks to Dr. Mouza Ghubash, director of the Ousha Hussein Cultural Rewaq Center, for approval to publish a part of the Sheikha Shamma Al Nahyan's thesis within the Occasional Paper series of the Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association.

We publish here Part Three of the Sheikha Shamma Al Nahyan's thesis, which examines the effects of the Second Gulf War (1990-1991) on security and stability in the Gulf region as well as design elements of a comprehensive strategy for achieving social and political security in the United Arab Emirates. Study deals with a significant and meaningful problem that lends itself to a substantial research effort. The weight of the issues examined by the author could be viewed at least from three points as follows: firstly, from the point of the UAE's citizens and leadership naturally interested in stable and sustainable development of their home country. Secondly, from the point of the Arabian countries and especially those located in the Gulf area as a stable and prosperous UAE can serve as a provider of regional security. And finally, from the point of developed countries interested in a stable and secure rich-Gulf region, which is a key component of global stability, especially in terms of world energy security.

It is possible to mention three cases at least from the recent past highlighting the significance and also actual meaning of the examined issues: The world oil crisis in the middle of the 1970s, First Gulf War (1980-1988) and finally Second Gulf War (1990-1991). All these events affected the state of security affairs in the UAE, Gulf region and also in the world. Beginning from the 1970s, the issues of security in the Arabian countries generally, and in the Gulf region especially, are in the spotlight of world affairs, foreign policy makers and also scholars in field of international relations and security studies. The study is a good contribution to this scientific field as it is based on original Arabian sources and finally, it is valuable as a new original source for itself.

*Alexander Duleba*

# I. Introduction

The aim of this study is to identify regional and international challenges to security in the Arabian Gulf region resulting from developments over the last decades as well as to examine their impact on the security in this area generally and in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) particularly. This study is also aimed at drawing up a strategy on strengthening political and social security of the UAE.

The Second Gulf War was not the first dispute with significant impacts on the political, social and economic security and stability in the Arabian Gulf countries. Among other reasons, this war was an outcome of the special nature that characterises countries of this region. The expression "special nature" is intended here to denote the nature of the social structure, which is characteristic for Gulf countries in addition to border disputes inherited from the colonial era. These problems were and still are like time bombs in the region. Furthermore, the strategic significance of the Arabian Gulf region on the international level is the matter that made it a "crisis area" throughout all its history.

However, the considerably new phenomenon of the Second Gulf War is that it affected all political, social and economic structures in traditional Arab societies. At the same time it brought about what can be called "erosion of the National Arab Security Concept" as well as "erosion of the Regional Security Concept" as they were developed before the war. And finally, it also justified a revival of a foreign military presence in its new disguise in the Gulf region.

This study is intended to answer the following central question: What are the most significant effects of the Second Gulf War on the security and stability in both of economic (social) and political context for the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)<sup>1</sup> countries generally and the UAE especially? The objective answer to this question, however, requires an understanding of the special nature of the Gulf region and the role of this (special) nature in regional security and stability concept. In what extent

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<sup>1</sup> The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) is a regional organisation established on 26 May 1981 by six Arab Gulf countries as follows: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar with the aim to co-ordinate their economic, political, cultural and security policy. One of the motives was a need for a common response of the Arab Gulf countries to the Iraqi-Iranian war (1980-1988) that challenged security in the whole region (editor's note).



was the Second Gulf War an accumulative result of this nature and also in what way it destroyed the most significant components of political and social security in the Gulf area?

Following the above mentioned we will try to answer this question through explaining three major issues as follows:

Firstly, the specificity of the Arabian Gulf region and the role of this specificity in configuration of a regional security agenda.

Secondly, the Second Gulf War and its effects on security agenda in the GCC countries.

And finally, the Second Gulf War and its economic, social and political consequences for the GCC countries.

Each of the above mentioned issues will be discussed in the light of several related minor issues as far as it is necessary for better understanding of the examined subject.

## **II. The Second Gulf War and its impact on security and stability in the GCC countries and the United Arab Emirates**

### **1. Security in the Arabian Gulf region: idiomatic features**

The special nature characterising the Arab Gulf countries in terms of their social and economic structure or in terms of their historical development and also the strategic significance of the Arab Gulf countries are main components of the political and social security agenda in the region. All these characteristic features are of crucial importance and have to be taken into account when we deal with the security agenda in a single Arab Gulf country and in the region as a whole. This matter can be explained as follows.

#### **Modernisation and traditional Arab societies**

The region of the Arabian Gulf in the Pre-modern State era was characterised by a social formation of a tribal nature, which was associated with the desert nature and Bedouin style of life. Tribal formation was typical for Arab countries prior to the establishment of modern states. Doubtless, transformation from the "Tribe" stage to the "Modern State" stage required transformation of the nature of the tribal social formation in order to suit the stage of the modern state and completion of its political, economic and social institutes. This process has required a "modernisation revolution", which effected all political economic and social structures and institutions of traditional Arab societies. The main challenge was if it possible to carry out such modernisation without destroying the existing social formation and traditions. In this context, the political and social security concept became central to the concerns of all Arab Gulf countries without an exception.

In addition, the special nature characterising the Arabian Gulf countries is imbalance in the population structure and disequilibrium between the growth of the national citizens' population (which tends to decrease) and the growth of foreign immigration (which tends to increase). Consequently, this factor leads to disequilibrium in the labour market between the national and expatriate manpower.

All these factors gave rise to the significance of political and social security concept in the Arab Gulf countries in addition to other factors. Thus, the concept of social and political security that reflects a process of societal modernisation viewed as comprehensive societal progress is a top priority for Arabian countries.

### **The oil factor and the region's strategic importance**

The Arabian Gulf region is one of the most strategically important regions in the contemporary world. The global importance of the region over the last decades was growing proportionally to the growing significance of oil as a strategic world commodity. The region became an area of struggle among Eastern and Western powers as well as regional power actors. This was main reason why the Arabian Gulf area became one of the most sensitive regions in the world in terms of military security. This external factor affected the political and social transformation processes in Arabian countries and was an additional reason why the concept of political and social security became a top priority in these countries.

However, it is possible to indicate certain major events and factors that increased the strategic weight of Arabian Gulf countries as far as the the oil resources are concerned. The most important of them are as follows:<sup>2</sup>

- A) The growing significance of Gulf oil in world politics after the Arab Oil War in 1973 and the world's growing dependence on Gulf oil, a factor which directly linked the Gulf's security and the superpowers' security strategies, including the growing foreign military presence in the region.
- B) The increase of the importance of the so-called "Oil factor" for Arabian policy which resulted in the growing role of the Gulf countries in the Arabian world, a factor explaining why the security of the Gulf countries became at the focus of the Arabian world's concern.
- C) The Arabian Gulf countries possess 45 percent of the world oil reserves and produce 19 per cent of the total world output. This matter denotes an increasing concentration of the reserves over the last decade as the share of Gulf countries' reserves absolutely increased from 302 billion barrels in 1985 to 464 billion barrels in 1991. Thus, the net increase was about 162 billion barrels of oil apart from the amount that has already been produced.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See *Gulf and Arab Security*, Al Khaleej Book, Al Khaleej Arab Studies, November 1991, p.3. (in Arabic).

<sup>3</sup> See Ali Khalifa Al Kawari, Jasim Al Saadoon, *The GCC Countries. A Futuristic View...*

## Colonial heritage

The factors mentioned above transformed the Arabian Gulf region into an "area of conflicts" or "centre of struggles" throughout its history. The region became at the focus of power aspirations of superpowers (i.e. United States, Soviet Union (formerly), Europe and Japan) as well as of regional powers (Iran and Iraq). As we intend to discuss the aspirations of regional powers later on, we would like here only to note that the colonial heritage of the Arabian Gulf countries enhanced the factors of disintegration and disagreement among them.

An explanatory example in this respect is the treaty signed by Great Britain and the Sheikhs of the Emirates in 1892, known as the "Preventive Treaty"... The main reason for concluding this treaty at that time was strengthening Britain's influence and control over the region, especially, when the then British government registered that the region's Sheikhs, namely Sheikh Zayed Bin Khalifa and Sheikh Rashid Bin Maktoum had expressed their dissatisfaction with the British interference in region's affairs. Namely, Sheikh Rashid supposed a possibility to develop co-operation with France as a friendly country in the region and in this way to evade the British "protection grip".<sup>4</sup> However, the British government prevented this move and urged the signing of a "Preventive treaty"... After sanction of this treaty by the British government, its special envoy Major Taliot travelled to Abu Dhabi with the treaty document, which stated:

### *Preventive Treaty*

*"In presence of Major Taliot, the resident representative of the British government in the Gulf, I hereby voluntarily bind myself and agree for myself and as well on behalf of my inheritors and successors to adhere to the following conditions:*

- 1. I will not enter, under any circumstances, in any agreement or any correspondence with any government except of the British Government.*
- 2. I will not agree with institution of any agent of any government except with the sanction of the British Government.*

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Development Forum, Annual Meeting Documents, January 1995. Girttas Publishing House, Kuwait 1996, p.32. (in Arabic).

<sup>4</sup> Ali Mohamed Rashid, *Political & Economic Agreements Made Between the Oman Coast Emirates and Britain (1806 - 1971) - U.A.E...* Writers and Authors, Union Publications, First Edition, 1989, p.129 (in Arabic).

3. *I will not abdicate under any circumstances, howsoever, nor will I sell, mortgage or otherwise accept occupation of any part of my Emirate except in favour of the British Government.*

*This treaty has been concluded on 6 Sha'aban, 1309 Hijri, which corresponds with 5 March 1892.*

*Signatures:*

<i>Zayed Bin Khalifa</i>	<i>- Sheikh of Abu Dhabi</i>
<i>Saker Bin Khalid Al Gasimi</i>	<i>- Sheikh of Sharjah</i>
<i>Rashid Bin Maktoum</i>	<i>- Sheikh of Dubai</i>
<i>Humaid Bin Rashid Al Nou'aimi</i>	<i>- Sheikh of Ajman</i>
<i>Ahmed Bin Abdulla Al Mu'aala</i>	<i>- Sheikh of Um Al Quwain"</i>

The main goal of this treaty as mentioned above was to strengthen the British presence in the area and at the same time to block any engagement of other foreign powers in the Emirates. It is need to underline that in the period just prior to the signing of the treaty various contracts were concluded between certain foreign countries and some Rulers of the Emirates with the aim of eliminating British influence in the region. There is no doubt that the so-called "Preventive treaty" resulted in the growing dependence of Emirates on Great Britain. The treaty was aimed at establishing an eternal subordination, as there were no termination dates stated. Moreover, the treaty was not only binding for the Rulers who signed it, but also for their successors. In addition, the treaty deepened disagreement and suspicions among the regional Rulers. One of the most important effects of the treaty was confusion of the borders of the Emirates in a manner that it was clear even at that time would cause border disputes in the future.<sup>5</sup>

The aforementioned treaty was only an example explaining how the colonial era enhanced disagreement and disintegration in addition to stirring border disputes whether among Arabian Gulf countries in general or within each country, in particular. This is another reason why the concept of a political and social security

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<sup>5</sup> For details see: Naji Sadiq Sharab, *U.A.E. Foreign Policy...* University Book House, U.A.E., First Edition 1987, pp.54-55. (in Arabic); Ali Mohamed Rashid, op. cit., pp.131-132 (in Arabic); Yahya El Jamal, *Constitution, A Means Of Integration in U.A.E..* In: Contemporary Arab Unionist Experiments, The U.A.E. Experiment, Researches and Studies of the Intellectual Forum organised by the Arab Unity Studies Centre, Arab Unity Studies Centre, Bayreuth, Third Edition, 1986, pp.565-566. (in Arabic).

in these countries is of crucial significance. It is worth mentioning here that the modern Gulf security agenda initially emerged at the beginning of the 1970s as one of the most significant consequences of the British withdrawal from the Gulf and establishment of new modern states in the region.<sup>6</sup>

### **Border disputes**

The Arabian Gulf countries inherited from the colonial past one of the most complicated problems which ever existed among them - "the border problem". The British Administration during its domination in the Gulf area marked the borderlines between states in a manner that left certain territories of each State or Emirate under the control of another State or Emirate. Whenever border disputes emerged in the colonial era, British Administration left them unsettled as they deepened disintegration of Arabian Rulers and made it easy to preserve a British domination in the area. The most important border disputes inherited by Arabian Gulf countries from the colonial era, which are still topical parts of the region's security agenda are as follows:<sup>7</sup>

#### *Border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait*

This dispute was the reason of a series of clashes between the two countries during various periods of their history, and especially, since Kuwait became an independent state. The then Iraqi president Abdul Kareem Gasim decided to annex Kuwait to Iraq in 1961. The conflict culminated again in March 1973. The lasting character of this dispute is caused, among other factors, also by the fact that the disputed area is oil-rich and has a strategic importance, especially for Iraq. This dispute was also a starting point for the Second Gulf War in 1990-1991. The issue of the Second Gulf War will be discussed in details later on in this study.

#### *Border disputes between Qatar and Bahrain*

The reason for this dispute is that each of these two countries believes that it has a right to certain lands controlled by the other. Qatar claims annexation of Howar Island, which is controlled by Bahrain. The Howar Island is located at a distance of

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<sup>6</sup> *Gulf and Arab Security*, Al Khaleej Book, op. cit., p.3.

<sup>7</sup> Mariam Sultan Ahmed Lotah, *The Internal Dimensions Of Gulf Security With Application On the U.A.E.*, Master's Thesis, Faculty of Economics and Political Sciences, Cairo University, 1987, p. 171 (in Arabic); see also: Mohamed Ridha Fodah, *Arabian Gulf National Security*, op. cit., p.12.

900 metres from Qatar, which means that it is nearer to Qatar than to Bahrain. No doubt, this dispute is one of the problems created by the colonial era.

Bahrain, on the other side, claims domination over the tribes living at Zebarah village. Moreover, the existing dispute between the two countries over Fashet Al Debbie Island is an extension of the dispute over Howar Island. Fashet Al Debbie Island (10 square kilometres) is located at a distance of 12 miles to the west of Qatar and 15 miles from the Bahraini Island Al Maharraq. The Qatari' North Gas Field (which is the second largest gas field in the world) extends into this island's area. The situation between the two countries has become critical in late April 1986, when Bahrain constructed a coast guard station in the island and refused the proposition of Qatar to equip it with a Qatari warning system. Then 4 Qatari aircraft attacked Fashet Al Debbel Island and captured 29 Dutch engineers working on the island. All peaceful attempts to settle the dispute failed despite the efforts of Abdullah Bushara, the then Secretary General of the Gulf Co-operation Council. However, due to efforts exerted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia the engineering works were suspended and the situation was reinstated, but the problem is still pending and could explode at any time.

#### *Buraimie Oasis dispute*

The dispute over Buraimie oasis is a triangular one, involving the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. It became acute at certain periods causing tensions in the mutual relations of these countries. The problem was referred to the Arab League<sup>8</sup> in 1955 and a solution was found in 1974 on the basis as follows: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia handed over in six oases to the United Arab Emirates and at same time Saudia was provided with a sea outlet for its oil in the Arabian Gulf at Thor Al Edaid. Thus, Saudi Arabia got an extra outlet for its oil further to Al Thair port.

#### *Dispute over territorial waters and continental shelf*

The struggle over the territorial waters and continental shelf among the Gulf countries has existed since long ago, but the intensity of this struggle was increased after discovery of oil in the area as many rich oil-fields are under Gulf waters. This

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<sup>8</sup> The Arab League was formed in 1945 to give common expression to the political interests of the Arab nations. Its 21 members include nearly all of the Arab states and the Palestine autonomy (before the Palestine Liberation Organisation). Its headquarters were formerly in Cairo, but moved to Tunis after the suspension of Egypt because of its peace agreement with Israel in 1979 (editor's note).

situation caused struggles and disputes over Gulf territorial waters and continental shelf either among the Gulf countries themselves or between the Gulf countries and Iran, or between the Gulf countries and Iraq on the other side.

There are disputes over territorial waters between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and also between Kuwait and Iraq. And finally, there is a dispute between most of the Gulf countries and Iran over the sharing of the continental shelf. There is no doubt that these disputes are among the security matters attracting major concerns of the Gulf countries. So much the more that a lot of the border problems reached the stage of military confrontation among them. These problems forced some countries in the Gulf region to occupy islands, which are under the control of other Gulf countries. This matter can be explained in the context of the following point.

***Iran's occupation of the three UAE' islands  
(Abu Musa, Greater Tonb and Minor Tonb)***

Iran's power aspirations in the Arabian Gulf region in general and towards the UAE in particular culminated in the occupation of the three UAE islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tonb and Minor Tonb.

Abu Musa Island is located at the entrance of the Arabian Gulf closely overlooking it "as an honest guard who stands before money safes".<sup>9</sup> It lies at a distance of about 45 miles from Sharjah inside the Arabian continental shelf and has an area of about 35 square km with a length of 7 km and a width of approximately 5 km. It is a rectangular island with an old history dating back 110 years to when Sheikh Salem Bin Sultan Al Gasimi constructed a palace there, remains of which are still visible today. Greater Tonb Island is located at a distance of 20 km from Ras Al Khaimah, 17 miles south west of Gashem Island and 16 miles from Al Hamra Island, which is to the north east of Abu Musa Island at a distance of 50 km. It has an area of approximately 9 square km. Minor Tonb Island lies 90 km offshore and at a distance of 8 miles to the west of Greater Tonb Island. It has a triangular shape with a length of one-mile extending from the north-west to the south-east and a width of three-quarters of a mile.

The Iranian aspirations on these islands date back to the 1920s when the Golden Valley Company discovered quantities of red oxide in Hormoz Island and planned to expand its activity on Abu Musa Island backed by Iranian government. In 1925,

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<sup>9</sup> Mohamed Hassan Al Ayderoos, *Political Developments In the U.A.E*, Zat Al Salasil Publications, Kuwait 1983, pp. 164-165 (in Arabic).



in spite of the British government's warning, the Iranian government sent a geological expedition on Abu Musa Island to investigate the quantities of the red oxide available there. In response to the British government's warning, the Shah regime instructed the Iranian custom officers to stop their aggressions and all other activities on the Tonb and Abu Musa Islands.<sup>10</sup> However, Iran's allegations re-emerged at the end of 1948 when it claimed that these islands constitute smuggling areas for goods to Iran, but the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs could contain these allegation.<sup>11</sup> Finally, the British policy failed to prevent Iran from occupying the three islands by force immediately after British withdrawal from the Gulf region. At half past five in the morning of Tuesday 30 November 1971 the Iranian naval and land forces carried out an unjustifiable invasion of the three Arabian islands of Greater Tonb, Minor Tonb and Abu Musa.

The occupation of the said three Arabian islands was due to the Iranian power aspirations on one hand and also the failure of the British government in settling the problem on the other hand despite its promise to do it. It was logical that the Arab League Council, at its extraordinary session on Monday, 6 December 1971, blamed Great Britain for its failure to meet its international obligations and to carry out its duties. However, the council also confirmed the Arabian identity of the three islands and condemned the occupation of Arabian lands by force, a matter that threatens security and stability in the region.<sup>12</sup>

However, we would like to conclude here that such foreign aspirations towards the UAE, connected with its strategic location, constitute a very serious security challenge, which is a matter of the top priority for the United Arab Emirates.

## **2. The First Gulf War (Iraqi-Iranian War, 1980-1988)**

The Gulf region faced another "scenario" drawn up by the regional aspirations in the area. However, this scenario did not directly involve all Gulf countries as it occurred between the two neighbouring countries of Iraq and Iran, but it had a strong impact on the security and stability in the Gulf region generally and for each of the Gulf countries particularly. The effects of the Iraqi – Iranian war on security of the

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<sup>10</sup> Mohamed Hassan Al Ayderoos, op.cit., p.166.

<sup>11</sup> For details see Mohamed Hassan Al Ayderoos, op. cit., pp.195-205.

<sup>12</sup> Ibidem, pp.485-486.

Gulf region are so important that we could call it the First Gulf War in a modern history of the region.

The First Gulf War (1980-1988) broke out between Iraq and Iran one year after the Iranian revolution and fall of the Shah's regime in 1979. The Gulf countries were confronted with a difficult choice during this war. While the alternative of take a neutral position was practically eliminated, the only remaining option for them was to become either pro or anti one of the conflicting parties. It has to be stressed that it was not an easy choice for them.

Supporting Iraq was a difficult matter due to the fact that ethnic Iranians constitute a high percentage of the population in the Gulf countries. It is beyond doubt that they were loyal to Iran. Moreover, there was need to take into account the fact that great parts of the Iranian population in Gulf countries are Shiites who are definitely loyal to Iran. Furthermore, Iran's victory would mean for them continuation of the Islamic revolution. On the other side, the Gulf countries dreaded Iran's victory because such victory would mean the fall of Iraq, which would in turn aggravate Iran's aspirations in the whole Gulf region. In this context, it would be logical for the Gulf countries to stand beside Iraq due to their national (Arab) commitment and the fear from Iran's victory. However, this also was not an easy option, as supporting Iraq would mean declaration of enmity against Iran. There is no doubt that the real circumstances in the Arabian Gulf countries (with regard to the limited number of population, lack of military capacities, small armies, etc.) prevented them entering into an open enmity with Iran.

First of all, we would like to focus attention on the impacts of this war on the social and political security and stability in the Gulf Co-operation countries. One of the impacts of this war was that it consumed lots of funds provided by these countries in support of Iraq. Furthermore, the Gulf countries were suffering a state of instability and lack of feeling of security as the Gulf region faced, since the beginning of the war, intensive actions of commotion and explosions, which claimed the lives of various Gulf nationals. However, it was not proved that Shiites or Iranians committed these actions, but this remained a possibility in view of the continuous Iranian threats in response to Gulf countries support to Iraq during the war.<sup>13</sup>

All these factors have definitely made political and social security an extremely important issue for all GCC countries without exception. In this context, the institution of the Gulf Co-operation Council in 1981 was a direct reaction to the Iraqi-Iranian war, intended to ensure the region's security and stability.

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<sup>13</sup> See Mariam Sultan Ahmed Lotah, *Internal Dimensions Of Gulf Security*, op.cit., p.165.

The above mentioned details may explain the most important events and developments, which led to the fact that the security issues became of top priority for the Arabian Gulf countries in their modern state era. The security agenda in the region at the present is a cumulative result of some factors as follows: the specificity of the social formation of the Gulf countries, the colonial heritage inherited from the past and also the disputes and military struggles from the last decades. However, the developments after the Second Gulf War (1990-1991) had an additional crucial impact on security and stability in the GCC countries as it will be showed in the following point.

### **3. The Second Gulf War (1990-1991)**

It will be no exaggeration to say that the Second Gulf War was a milestone in security developments in the Arabian Gulf region as it overturned all equations with the past regarding to security and stability within the Gulf region. Explaining effects of this war, we base our thesis on group of facts as follows.

#### **A turning point in the history of Arab-Arab disputes**

The Second Gulf War was, without doubt, the first war between Arab countries, which was waged with such intensity and depth. With the exception of the earlier mentioned border tensions between some Gulf countries, the Second Gulf war remains a turning point in the history of the Arab-Arab disputes. It was the first war waged in the Arabian area with the goal of complete occupation by military force of the territory belonging to one Arab country (Kuwait) by another Arab country (Iraq). For the first time in modern Arab history, a goal was stated to annex all territories and properties of the assailed country and make them a part of the territory and property of the aggressor country.

Furthermore, this war shall remain, until further notice, an incidental feature on the national security "and we will not be exaggerating if we assume that, prior to the summer of 1990, no Arab Defence Ministry had a readily set complete defence plan for use against a neighbouring Arab country".<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Haytham El Kaylani, *Arab National Security Concept*, in: Arab Security. Existing Challenges and Future Aspirations. Arab European Studies Centre, Washington, First Edition 1996, pp.60-61 (in Arabic).

## **Erosion of National Arab Security Concept**

If the Second Gulf War has been an incidental feature of the Arab national security, as hinted in the foregoing lines, this war consequently caused the erosion and, out of shyness we deny to say "the fall" of the Arab national security concept. If we take into consideration the indisputable fact that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the declaration of annexation of Kuwait was initially a challenge in terms of historical, political and legal contexts shared by Arab countries, it grew into war that damaged the remaining part of the Arab national security concept.<sup>15</sup> The reasons are as follows:

- A) The Arab countries failed to deter the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait or even to achieve a consensus in a clear rejection of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, a country, which is a member of the Arab League, even though Article Five of the Arab League Charter stipulates abstention from resorting to force to settle disputes between two or more member countries.
- B) The failure of the Arab League to adhere to Article Two of the Treaty for Common Defence and Economic Co-operation among the Arab League Member Countries. This article stresses the principle of a collective security and common defence against aggression. Thus, the crisis moved beyond the control of the Arab countries and was internationalised.
- C) This war had a negative impact on Arabian solidarity and unanimity, the matter which was stated by the decision taken by the Arab League' Council at its extraordinary session of 3 August 1990. The passed declaration condemned the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, disapproved all its effects and demanded an immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwaiti territory. This decision was taken by a majority of 14 votes from a total count of 21 votes.

The similar situation was repeated at the Arab Summit hold in Cairo on 10 August 1990. The Cairo Summit condemned the aggression against Kuwait and refused to acknowledge the annexation of Kuwait, etc. But this resolution was approved by twelve countries only (namely by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, Morocco, Tunis, Somalia, Djibouti, Syria and Lebanon) and rejected by three countries (Iraq, of course, further by Palestine and Libya, while three other countries expressed their reservations (Mauritania, Jordan and Sudan). The result was that the Arab countries failed to achieve unanimity towards a crucial issue threatening Arab security as a whole. The Second Gulf War demonstrated the lack of unanimity among Arab countries in such a crisis situation.

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<sup>15</sup> For details see: *Gulf & Arab Security*, op. cit., pp.115-118.

## **Erosion of the Regional Security Concept**

If the Second Gulf War revealed the incredibility of the Arab national security concept, as shown above, it led at the same time to retreating from the regional security concept. The Second Gulf War revealed the fragile nature of the regional organisations formed within the Arabian world (i.e. Arab League, Arab Co-operation Council, Union of Arab Magreb Countries and Gulf Co-operation Council).<sup>16</sup>

Although the Arab Co-operation Council (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Yemen) was established with the aim of achieving economic integration among its members and restrain actions, which may jeopardise the security of member states (whether directly or indirectly), yet this organisation failed to provide a practical solution to the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis. Ironically, the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein assured the Egyptian President at the beginning of the crisis that he would not wage an aggression against Kuwait, while, at the same time, the attack procedures were in progress. Moreover, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait gave rise to disagreement among the member countries, when the Yemeni President (Ali Abdullah Saleh) and King Hussein of Jordan supported Iraq whereas they should have denounced the aggression, or at least, remained in a neutral position. The final outcome was complete distraction of the Arab Co-operation Council.

The objective of the Gulf Co-operation Council was to maintain factors of political and social security among Arabian Gulf countries through achievement of economic, social (cultural) and military integration among them.<sup>17</sup> While the idea of establishing this organisation dates back to the second half of 1970s, the developments faced by the Arabian Gulf countries since the early 1980s (namely the First Gulf War) had revealed the need to establish regional institutions and activate their role to ensure the region's security and stability.

The Second Gulf War had ruined the region's security and stability and at the same time, showed the incredibility of the regional security concept. The evidence for this is that the Gulf Co-operation Council failed to adopt an effective way of confronting the crisis, which resulted in war (Desert Storm). Further, the member countries failed to unambiguously assume the duty of liberation of Kuwait, the matter, which resulted in requesting the assistance of foreign powers.

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<sup>16</sup> See Mohamd Ridha Fodah, *Arabian Gulf National Security*, op. cit., p.116.

<sup>17</sup> For more see: Mohamed Hassan Al Ayderoos, *GCC Countries Political Security*, Al Mutanabi Printing & Publishing House, Abu Dhabi, First Edition 1996, pp.19-38 (in Arabic); Staff Colonel Mohamed Ahmed Al Hamid, *Gulf Security & Its Impacts On GCC Countries*, U.A.E, Strategic Studies & Researches Centre, First Edition 1998, pp.282-287 (in Arabic).

## Revival of the foreign military presence in the region

As we already have pointed out, the Arabian Gulf region was a target of superpowers' aspirations throughout its history, because of the region's strategic location and later on also discovery of rich oil reserves. It is beyond doubt that the superpowers were keen to establish an influence in the area.<sup>18</sup>

The fall of the Soviet Union is a reason why the USA became a sole superpower in the modern world with no real competitor. It is possible to say that the formerly Soviet and now Russian role and policy became subordinated to the USA. Since the British withdrawal from the Arabian Gulf area in the early 1970s, the USA has endeavoured to maintain its interests in the region. In early 1975, the U.S. government, through the then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, issued a statement warning the Arabian oil countries of the possibility of military intervention if they again decided to implement an oil embargo against the USA.<sup>19</sup>

The move by Saddam Hussein in the summer of 1990 constituted a chance for the USA to ensure its presence in the Arabian Gulf area. Iraqi attack on Kuwait provided a logical justification for US engagement in the conflict and also enhanced the role the USA started to play in the world and also in the region.

Anyway, we intend to stress here that the Second Gulf War revived the foreign presence, especially the American one, in the Arabian Gulf region providing legal justification for its continuation as it is considered to be a guarantee of political security in this region. This is why the USA was keen to maintain a permanent military presence in the Arabian Gulf even after the end of the crisis and Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. The U.S. military presence consists of naval, ground and air forces based in the region.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> For more see: Lincoln Blew Mefielden, *American Policy In The Arabian Gulf Region*, U.A.E. Strategic Studies and Researches Centre, U.A.E. Lectures Series (5), First Edition, 1997 (in Arabic); Abd El Moniem El Mashat, *Gulf Security - A Study On Perception & Policies*, in: Abd El Moniem El Mashat (Editor), *Gulf Security - A Study In Perception and Policies*, Political Studies and Researches Centre, Faculty Of Economics and Political Sciences, Cairo, University, 1994, pp 5-32 (in Arabic); Wadoodah Badran, *The American Concept of Gulf Security*, in : Abd El Moniem El Mashat (Editor), *Arabian Gulf Security - A Study On Perception & Policies*, op. cit., pp.369-399 (in Arabic).

<sup>19</sup> Salah El Aagad, *Political Currents In Arabian Gulf From The Beginning Of Modern Ages Up To 1990 - 1991 Crisis*, Egyptian Anglo Library, First Edition 1991, pp.417-418 (in Arabic).

<sup>20</sup> For more see: Mohamed El Sayed Idris, *Oman, UAE, Qatar And Bahrain Concepts Of Gulf Security*, in: Abd El Moniem El Mashat (Editor), *Arabian Gulf Security - A Study On Perception and Policies*, op. cit., pp.220-223 (in Arabic).

## **Retreating from crucial Arab issues**

As shown above, the impact of the Second Gulf War was not limited to the Gulf region only, but affected the whole Arab World. Moreover, this war eroded the national and regional Arab security concepts and at the same time affected the nature of the crucial issues, which create a common security agenda for the Arab countries from the Ocean to the Gulf. Namely, it had negative effect on the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the one hand, Israel obtained an additional military and financial support from the U.S., which it claimed by arguing a need to defend its security, especially after Iraqi missile attacks on Israeli territory. On the other hand, the Second Gulf War, which was a result of Iraqis occupation of Kuwait provided justification for Israel to prevent any linking between this crisis and the issue of Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The leaders of Israel argued that the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis had angled the Arab-Israeli relations. Isaac Shameer tried to obliterate this fact in his statement made on 8 August 1990, when he said: "The Gulf problem puts aside all problems of the region, including our conflict with the Palestinians."<sup>21</sup>

Thus, it is possible to say that the Second Gulf War and the following disagreement among the Arabs led to transformation of the main contradiction (or conflict) in the region from the Israeli -Arab context to an Arab - Arab context. Especially if we take into account the fact that the Palestinian President Yasir Arafat supported Iraq in its aggression against Kuwait.

If the foregoing points highlighted the impact of the Second Gulf war on the security and stability in the Arab world generally and the GCC countries particularly, the following points aim to explain the war's impacts on the economic, social and political structures in these countries.

## **4. Shifting towards a military security concept: political, economic and social consequences**

We intend to explain the most significant consequences of the Second Gulf War on the (internal) economic, social and political (security) structures of the GCC countries.


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<sup>21</sup> Ahmed Sidgi Al Dajani, *Palestine Issue And Arab-Zionist Conflict after Gulf War*, in: *Gulf Crisis And Its Impacts On Arab World*, Working Papers and Discussions Of the Intellectual Forum organised by the Arab Integration Studies Centre, Bayreuth, Second Edition 1997, pp.100-101 (in Arabic).

The issues we addressed at the beginning of this study partly highlight the impacts of the Second Gulf war on the internal structures of the GCC countries from an economic, social and political point of view. We also showed how the Second Gulf War changed the equilibrium and existing security and stability equations in the GCC countries in the context of external factors of security. Now, we intend to deal with issue on how this war changed the equilibrium and also the existing security equations in the context of internal security factors (economic, social and political) in the GCC countries.

We assume, before hand, that there is an equation on which the political, social and economic security is based<sup>22</sup> as the following diagram shows it:

### The Political, Social & Economic Equation




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<sup>22</sup> See also Mariam Sultan Anmed Lotah, *Internal Dimensions Of Gulf War*, op. cit., p.6; Omar Abdullah Kamil, *Arab Security From An Economic Point Of View*, in: Arab Security - Existing Challenges and Future Aspirations, op. cit., pp.82-86.



This equation works in a context of equilibrium between external and internal security challenges. Furthermore, it functions in a context of equilibrium and interaction among its four components, that is the political, social, economic and military components, provided that no component overpowers any other or is given preference at the expense of the other components.

However, the Second Gulf War led to disequilibrium, whether on the level of the equilibrium/interaction relations between external and internal security challenges, or on the level of the balancing and interactive relations among the above mentioned four components. The resulting effects for the GCC countries are as follows:

- A) Being concerned about external security challenges more than about internal challenges, their policy concern was directed, in the first place, to the external security threats at the expense of the internal ones.
- B) Prevalence of military security over civil security or what is called societal security, which connects security and the way of life in the society, that is development in its comprehensive concept (economic, political and social standards). Societal security means security in a comprehensive dimension and or human development.
- C) Decline of the rates of government expenditures on societal development programs in the Gulf Co-operation Council countries and at the same time a growth of military expenditures in general.
- D) Decline of economic growth rates in most of the GCC countries. It is not a coincidence that the deficit rate in government budgets of the GCC countries has been significantly growing since the early 1990s.

While the foregoing factors explain the role of the Second Gulf War in changing the equilibrium and equations of the GCC countries' security in general, at the same time they also explain direct impacts on internal economic, political and social structures of these countries. This can be illustrated by the following facts:

### **Decline of economic growth rates in the GCC countries**

Statistical data show that the GDP of the GCC countries in total has been considerably decreasing since the early 1990s as this figure was about 195 billion USD in 1982 but dropped to approximately 183 billion USD in 1992.<sup>23</sup>

If we treat the development of the GDP per capita in the GCC countries after reviewing the development of population growth, figures indicate that the average

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<sup>23</sup> Ali Khalifa Al Kawari, Jasim Khalid Al Saadoon, *GCC Countries - A Futuristic View*, op. cit., p.29.

GDP per capita in the current prices was about 10.5 thousand USD in 1982 and became 8.1 thousand in 1992. This figure indicates that a decline in the economic growth rates has occurred during the period of the Second Gulf War.<sup>24</sup>

### **Rising budget deficits in the GCC countries**

The matter was not limited to the decline of economic growth, but it was also found that the GCC countries began to suffer a growing problem since the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s: a growing budget deficit in these countries.

The data in the foregoing table illustrate that the state budgets of all the GCC countries without exception have suffered significant growth of deficit, which reached its climax during the Second Gulf War period. The GCC countries' governments resorted to financing this deficit by taking internal and external credits. The credits whether internal or external will require additional allocations in the state budgets for interest payments. This constitutes a new item of state budgets, which will diminish the total revenues aimed to support social and economic development programs in order to meet credit obligations.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Ibidem, p. 29.

<sup>25</sup> Ibidem, p. 31.

	Deficit or Surplus (Million Dollars)						Percentage to Gross domestic Product (GDP)					
	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995 <sup>(1)</sup>	1996 <sup>(2)</sup>	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	3,166-	60-	831-	2,268-	2,655-	1,9223-	9.33-	0.17-	2.34-	6.46-	6.63	4.31
<b>Bahrain</b>	180-	306-	5-	155-	337-	146-	4.24	6.91-	0.11-	3.19-	6.66-	2.73-
<b>Kingdom of Saudi Arabia</b>	31,656-	11,133-	12,402-	9,288-	7,325-	5,073-	26.82-	9.04-	10.46-	7.73-	5.85-	2.02-
<b>Oman</b>	21-	856-	1,349-	1,289-	1,297-	504-	0.18-	6.88-	10.79-	9.98-	9.43-	3.31-
<b>Qatar</b>	385-	305-	916-	786-	357-	847-	5.59-	4.00-	12.80-	10.66-	4.38-	10.10-
<b>Kuwait</b>	25383-	18,623-	5,219-	4,925-	2,660-	2,182-	234.47-	93.75-	21.75-	19.86-	13.75-	7.04-

(1) Actual Preliminary

(2) Preliminary Budgets & Estimates

Source: Arab Economic Report, September 1997, Table (1/6) p. 309. (by Arabic)

## Growing defence expenses of the GCC countries

Previously identified defect economic aspects can be better understandable if we take into account the financial obligations and costs incurred by various GCC countries during the Second Gulf War.

### Financial obligations undertaken by selected Gulf countries during the Second Gulf War (in billion \$)

	Initial Obligation	Second Obligation	Total Obligation	Cash Payments	Payments in Kind	Total Payments
<b>Kingdom of Saudi Arabia</b>	3.339	13.500	16.839	12.809	4.045	16.858
<b>Kuwait</b>	2.506	13.550	16.056	16.015	44	16.059
<b>United Arab</b>	1.000	3.088	4.088	3.870	218	4.088
<b>Total</b>	6.845	30.138	36.983	32.694	4.703	37.005

Source: Steven Daget, Gary G. Pajliano, *The Second Gulf War: The Allies' Costs And Financial Contributions...* Emirates Strategic Studies & Research Centre, International Studies, No.4, D.T., p.31 (in Arabic).

The figures show that the total amount of financial burdens incurred by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE due to the Second Gulf War exceeds 37 billion USD, out of which the United Arab Emirates incurred more than 4 billion USD.

These financial obligations have led to a decline of the economic growth rates and also to the restriction of expenditures aimed at supporting societal development programs. This fact can be illustrated by figures as follows:

**(Public) Running Expenditure Functional Classification In GCC States (1991-1996)**  
**Percentages**

	Public Services Expenses						Social Services Expenses						Economic Affairs Expenses						Security & Defence Expenses					
	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	15.47	18.34	18.32	19.37	19.37	17.41	6.43	8.45	8.52	9.26	9.26	8.32	26.68	11.46	11.45	12.11	12.11	10.88	20.30	24.08	24.05	25.42	25.42	22.84
<b>Bahrain</b>	15.27	15.49	21.48	21.67	20.95	20.95	32.22	32.25	30.20	29.73	31.05	31.05							9.84	39.84	39.84	26.19	34.77	37.35
<b>Kingdom of Saudi Arabia</b>	27.94	27.17	29.54	25.33	26.27	25.30	25.29	29.00	27.88	29.66	29.33	29.67	9.35	8.73	8.15	8.28	8.15	8.42	24.11	31.82	31.32	33.47	33.00	33.50
<b>Oman</b>	7.36	6.74	5.78	6.46	6.46	6.46	26.68	27.43	27.87	24.27	24.27	24.27	10.38	9.92	10.13	10.18	10.18	10.18	43.97	44.74	42.73	43.34	43.34	43.34
<b>Qatar</b>	11.50	11.50	11.50	11.50	11.50	11.50	24.92	24.92	24.92	24.92	24.92	24.92	15.34	15.34	15.34	15.34	15.34	15.34	24.50	34.50	34.50	34.50	34.50	34.50
<b>Kuwait</b>	0.24	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.43	10.93	22.70	21.12	24.59	22.25	1.75	3.60	7.22	6.53	7.63	6.34	3.80	14.53	29.28	27.23	29.28	27.51

Source: Arab Economic Report, September (1997), pp. 314-315 (in Arabic)

The figures show to what extent the Second Gulf War led to restriction of state financial support for the societal and economic programs at the expense of security and defence expenditures in the GCC countries.. There is a considerable difference between the rates of expenditures aimed at security and defence and those allocated for public and social services and economic programs.

The following data also show some aspects of the budget imbalance, which is characteristic for state expenditures of the oil producing Arab countries during period of 1987-1993.

### State expenditures in oil-producing Arab countries in period of 1987 – 1993 (%)

Description	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
<b>Public Services</b>	28.64	24.61	28.51	24.44	21.12	21.67	22.58
<b>Security &amp; Defence</b>	25.90	28.75	25.42	31.55	24.59	25.42	28.46
<b>Social Services</b>	26.45	28.07	23.31	23.46	18.00	21.63	23.74
<b>Economic Services</b>	10.50	7.49	9.49	9.89	27.71	21.54	13.33
<b>Other</b>	8.72	10.81	12.49	10.66	8.60	9.74	11.89

Waleed Khadoori, *The Oil Industry In The Gulf Between Past Restrictions and Future Challenges*, in: *Power in the Gulf - Challenges & Threats..* Translated by Khalil Hamad, Emirates, Strategic Studies & Research Centre, First Edition 1997, p. 230 (in Arabic).

The above data reflect high rates of expenditure on security and defence if we compare them with total government expenditures, growing from 25.9 per cent in 1978 to 28.46 per cent in 1993, while in 1991 the figure was 31.55 per cent. It should be noted here that economic expenditures were the lowest item in the GCC countries' budgets.

The indisputable fact derived from the figures shown above is that the prevalence of the military security concept over the societal one led to the reality that expenditure on security, defence and military purposes were increasing at the expense of state support for societal development programs. In the light of the foregoing facts we can conclude that the Second Gulf War led to domination of a "military security concept" over "societal security concept" in the GCC countries. This conclusion can also be proved by figures as follows:

## Imbalance in military expenditures and exploitation of resources in GCC countries

	Expenditure on military aspect								Traditional arms imports		Total defence forces staff	
	In million U.S. \$ at 1995 price		As percentage of GNP		Individual's share in US \$ at 1995 price		Military expenditure as percentage of expenditure on both education and health		In million US \$ (Record in 1990 = 100)		In thousands (Record in 1985 = 100)	
	1985	1995	1985	1995	1985	1995	1960	1990-91	1995	1995	1995	1995
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	2790	1880	7.6	4.8	2031	1044	#N/A	44	427	46	70.0	163
<b>Kingdom of Saudi Arabia</b>	24530	13215	19.6	10.6	2125	699	150	151	961	39	162.5	260
<b>Bahrain</b>	206	261	3.5	5.2	494	456	#N/A	41	353	88	10.7	382
<b>Kuwait</b>	2453	3147	9.1	11.8	1434	2091	#N/A	88	1117	396	16.6	138
<b>Qatar</b>	410	326	6.0	4.4	1301	600	#N/A	192	#N/A	#N/A	1.3	130
<b>Oman</b>	2946	1840	20.8	15.1	1841	978	#N/A	293	#N/A	#N/A	43.5	1740

Source: Human Development Report, 1997, p.188 (in Arabic).

The details of the above table show that governments of the GCC countries consider defence expenditures more important than expenditures on education and health.

The rates of military expenses (as percentages of total expenses on education and health) show the immense gap between the military spending and that on education and health, which is 41 per cent in Bahrain, 44 in the UAE, 88 in Kuwait, 151 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 192 in Qatar and 293 in Oman. In addition, military expenditure consumes a great portion of the GDP of these countries as compared to other (social, economic and service) fields, with 4.8 per cent of the UAE's GDP being aimed at defence in 1990 as against 10.6 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 15.1 in Oman, 11.8 in Kuwait, 5.2 in Bahrain and 4.4 in Qatar.

Other statistics indicate a continuous rise of defence spending in the GCC countries during the recent years as follows:

Country	Expenditures (in billion USD)
Saudi Arabia	17.9
Kuwait	3.7
U.A.E.	2.2
Bahrain	0.3
Oman	1.8
Qatar	1.1

Source: Al Ahram Al Arabi-First Year, Issue No. 51,14 March 1998, p. 15 (in Arabic).

It can be said that the high military spending is made at the expense of expenditures on economic and social services. Furthermore, it leads to imbalance in payments or withdrawal from deposits which will lead to escalation of inflation and devaluation of local currencies. Among other effects are decrease of the citizens saving and also investment shares in the GDP.<sup>26</sup>

The following figure shows the risk of dependence on a military security method while aiming to achieve a political and social security.<sup>27</sup>


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<sup>26</sup> For more see Abd El Razig El Faris, *Arms & Bread - Military Spending In Arab World - 1970-1990*, A Study In Political Economics, Arab integration Studies Centre, Beirut, First Edition 1993, pp.290-293.

<sup>27</sup> Amin Howaidi, *Militarization & Security In The Middle East*, Dar El Shoroug, Cairo, First Edition 1991, p. 91 (in Arabic).



**Pattern Showing the Risk In Depending  
On Military Method In Achieving  
Political and Social Security**



## 5. The Second Gulf War and regional security: a summary

This part of the study was intended to show the impacts of the Second Gulf War (1990-1991) on security and stability in the GCC countries. However, the comprehensive understanding of this issue cannot be achieved without taking into consideration the structural specificity, which characterises these countries in addition to the nature of the historical developments experienced by them. This specificity and these historical developments contributed significantly to the modern security agenda of the Arab Gulf countries even prior to the Second Gulf War. In this respect various factors have to be taken into account. The most important of them are as follows:

1. The specificity of the social formation of the Arabian Gulf countries with regard to their tribal nature before the modern state era. The transition from the (tribe) stage to the modern state one required a "modernisation revolution", which had to be achieved without destroying the existing societal formation.
2. The special feature characterising most of these countries is a comparatively small native population, the result of which is an imbalance in demographic structure in favour of an expatriate population.
3. The strategic significance of these countries in terms of their share in world oil reserves which made them a focus of superpowers' aspirations throughout their history.
4. The border problems and disputes inherited from the colonial era.
5. The First Gulf War (1980 - 1988).

If the above factors led to growing importance of the security and stability concept in the GCC countries, the Second Gulf War (1990-1991) was a milestone, which destroyed previous security equations in the Arab world in general and in the GCC countries in particular. The reasons were as follows:

1. It was a turning point in the history of Arab-Arab disputes.
2. It eroded the national Arab (on Arab homeland level) and regional (on the GCC countries level) security concepts.
3. It led to retreat from crucial Arab issues.
4. It provided justification for revival and continuation of the foreign military presence in the Gulf area.

The Second Gulf War had deep impacts on security policy making in the GCC countries, with consequent impacts on economic, social and political security. The most important impacts could be outlined as follows:

1. Focusing on external security challenges at the expense of internal development challenges.
2. Decline of the GDP and economic growth rates in these countries.
3. Rising deficits of the state budgets in the GCC countries.
4. A shift towards a military security concept which led to:
  - a) Increased spending on security and defence at the expense of societal development programs and social needs.
  - b) Worsening of the balance of payments, escalation of inflation rates, declines in citizens' savings and also investment shares in the GDP.

The factors mentioned above have a structural character, which determines the modern security agenda in the region, especially after the Second Gulf War. The manner in which the Second Gulf War occasioned deviations as to the GCC governments' attitudes toward security is regarded, creates a permanent base for revealing the crisis-catastrophe,<sup>28</sup> which occurred in the region and which can lead to recurrence of similar crisis – catastrophes in the future.

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<sup>28</sup> This expression is quoted from Khaldoun El Naqeeb, *Permanent Structural Factors In the Gulf War Catastrophe*, in: *Gulf Crisis And Its Impacts On Arab World*, op. cit., p.43.

### **III. Towards a comprehensive political and social security strategy in the United Arab Emirates**


This part of the study is intended to draw up a strategy facilitating consolidation of the UAE's political and social security at the present and in the future. While saying that we intend to draw up a strategy that facilitates consolidation of the State's political and social security, we implicitly confess existence of the State's endeavours and policies aiming to achieve its political and social security in both of internal and also external dimensions. However, we would like to stress here that our intention is to seek additional security components that will lead to a comprehensive advancement of the UAE's society.

In order to develop such a strategy, which will be as practical and applicable as possible, real facts, societal circumstances and factors both of domestic and international characters have to be taken into account. According to this, we think that a comprehensive strategy on the UAE' security has to be drawn up in the light of the following considerations:

1. It has to be developed in the light of UAE's national and regional interests as the State's political and social security surpass the political borders of the UAE. It also concerns the surrounding countries in regional terms (Arab Gulf States) and in national terms (on the Arab nation level). Moreover, no single Arab country can individually achieve a political and national security out of the other Arab Countries whether on the regional or national level. In this respect, it must be stressed that there is a need in activation of the Arab regional and national organisations' role, for example the Gulf Co-operation Council and Arab League.
2. The strategy must be developed in the light of balance between external and or internal challenges to security. Internal challenges are not less important than external ones in terms of their impact on the political and social security of the State. Moreover, internal stability of the State's political, economic and social structures constitutes a necessary pre-condition for confronting any external challenge and or threat.
3. The strategy has to come from an evaluation of the State's material and human capabilities and their proper exploitation in the way, which guarantees achievement of comprehensive societal development.

4. Moreover, the strategy must be formed in the light of equilibrium and interactions among political, economic, social and military factors. Although, it is difficult to separate the factors mentioned above, predominance of one of the factors over others does not correspond to an integrated security strategy of the State. All military, economic, social and political factors must be taken into account.
5. Consequently, a solely applied military method in achieving political and social security is not productive. There is a need to focus attention on the societal method in achieving a comprehensive security, which is a method leading to the transformation of all-societal structures and institutes. In other words, a societal method leads towards a comprehensive societal development in all basic fields such as the political, economic, social, cultural and military ones.
6. Developing such strategy, there is a need to take into account challenges impeding achievement of the UAE's comprehensive security and first of all those imposed by the nature of the political, economic and social structure of the UAE's society.

There is no doubt that these pivots operate in an interactive context as the following diagram shows it:



In the light of the above considerations we can discuss issues concerning capabilities and methods on how to achieve political as well as economic and social security in the UAE.

## **1. Political security**

The political security of any country depends on the capability to restore and enhance its political independence and also protect its traditional societal norms against external and internal threats. This is a reason why there is a direct relationship between political security and political sovereignty. The State should be able to make decisions protecting its sovereignty and also it has to carry out an independent administration in a way, which enhances its strategic weight, advances its ability to exert influence and maintains its power in terms of domestic and also foreign policies. Doubtless, political security as specified above, cannot be achieved without effective political and military institutions.

Effective political institutions constitute a vehicle enabling the state to achieve its political security. Any defect of political institutions (whether legislative, executive or judiciary) will have negative impacts on the state's ability to achieve its political security. Also, political security necessitates a military power, which enables the state to restore its political security and independence. Now, we would like to suggest some measures and methods aiming to increase the effectiveness and competence of state institutions dealing with political security in the UAE on the two levels as follows: institutional and civil.

### **Institutional level**

- A) The first is an improvement of co-operation among political institutions in the way, which deepens the UAE's Federal process.
- B) Enhancement of the legislative role of the Federal National Council (FNC) in a manner that its competence will not be restricted to reviewing draft laws submitted by the government (including the right to amend or reject them). The FNC's competence has to be extended also to the right to prepare and submit laws.

C) Finally, co-ordination among political institutions on the Federal State level and the political institutions on the Emirate' level (i.e. local departments) has to be enriched in the manner that it will enhance the federal character of the UAE.

### **Civil level**

Regardless of the competent political and military institutions, any State will never be able to achieve its political security without the citizens' participation. This is why the people's participation in building political and military security in the UAE must be one of the top priorities. Citizens' participation cannot be effective without a nation-wide educational program designed to achieve the following aims:

#### **A) *Deepening the State's identity and loyalty to it***

The pivotal point in political and national security in general is the citizen's concern about national security, which indicates their loyalty and affiliation to the State as well as their readiness to sacrifice. We would like to stress that an educational plan has to be adopted and executed by all political, educational and informational authorities with the aim of deepening citizens' national affiliation and loyalty to the country as well as restoration of the UAE's national, intellectual and cultural identity.

#### **B) *Campaigns on security threats***

As the UAE faces various security threats on both the external and internal level, onward national information strategy has to be performed with the aim of informing the citizens and making them aware of the security challenges threatening UAE society.

#### **C) *Response to security threats***

The public warning campaigns will not be effective if they are restricted to the defence concept only. It has to be extended also to a deterrence concept and therefore, the idea of sacrifice must be stressed in the manner that it will enhance citizens' readiness to exterminate any source of external or internal threats and also strengthen a spirit of seriousness, precision and discipline.

#### **D) *Citizens' training in holding national secrets***

Each State has special services, production and sites that are important in terms of national security and have a confidential character. Information leakage in this case presents a direct threat to national security. Therefore, it is necessary that citizens everywhere, especially those who have access to national secrets must be trained in maintaining confidentiality, which effect the security and sovereignty of the Slate.

### ***E) A National program on job nationalisation***

In this coherence, one has to take into account the special demographic structure of the UAE. The security aims and methods as mentioned above are to be implemented in the country where the share of foreign residents is higher than that of national citizens (75 – 25 per cent). Foreign manpower dominates in the labour market of the UAE and this is so in the major economic, educational and service activities. Therefore, we think, it will be necessary for the State to adopt an urgent long-term program on nationalisation of the major and sensitive jobs at the various levels of the Federal State.

If we presume that suggested actions are elementary conditions for strengthening the UAE's political security, then their implementation requires further co-ordination and interaction between official political institutions and the citizens throughout the country and in each member Emirate of the Federation. Implementation of these actions must be carried out in a manner that will enhance the Federal State's authority and also its ability to confront internal and external security challenges.

## **2. Economic and social security**


The major point we would like to stress here is that political security cannot be achieved apart from economic and social security. Economic and social security constitutes the main pillar anchoring a political security. Economic and social security is related to the State's ability to provide minimum living standards (economic and social) for members of the society in the manner which improves their quality of life. Thus, comprehensive development of the society in terms of advancing quality of life is a key indicator of the economic and social security.

If we have already discussed the risks of a solely "military method" in security policy, it is our intention to stress here the importance of the "societal method" in achieving the national security of the State in its comprehensive sense as shown by the following diagram

**Aim:** National security in its comprehensive understanding (political, economic and social).

**Means:** Societal method.





If the above diagram shows a complex strategy on how to achieve political, economic and social security, its implementation must be based on two basic preconditions as follows:

- material and human resources
- challenges imposed by social and economic structure

Regarding the first point (material and human resources) no one can deny the progress achieved by the UAE in economic and social development and also an effort of the State exerted in improving performance of the national economy and social standards. Statistical data show that the UAE's economic performance has been significantly improved in 1995 when the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) increased to about 147 billion Dirhams compared to about 136 billion Dirhams in 1994 at an annual growth rate of 8.3 per cent. There are two main reasons for the GDP growth:

First: The rise of crude oil average prices in the world market from 15.5 USD per barrel in 1994 to about 17 USD per barrel in 1995. The rise of world oil prices shared 6.5 per cent in a total growth of the GDP in 1995 as compared to 1994.

Second: The share of non-oil sectors in GDP growth in 1995 was in 9.1 per cent higher compared to 1994. If we review the structure of the GDP for 1995 by sectors, the share of the Government Services Sector was the biggest (11.3 per cent of the GDP). The reason was the State's concern about supporting educational and health services to the UAE's citizens and also foreign residents throughout the Emirates.

The next table shows the continual improvement of the UAE's economic performance.

<b>Economic changes</b>	<b>1995*</b>	<b>1996*</b>	<b>1997**</b>
Population (in thousands)	2378	2443	2580
Workers (in thousands)	994	1051	1122
GDP (billion Dirhams)	147,5	163,7	171
Product for Oil sector (billion Dirhams)	99,5	106,7	112
Total building of fixed capital (billion Dirhams)	39,8	41	42,5
Individuals average income (thousands Dirhams)	55,1	60,8	60,1
Ultimate consumer expenditure (billion Dirhams)	94,7	100,6	107,2
Total commodity exports (billion Dirhams)	105,2	121	123,3
Total commodity imports (billion Dirhams)	87,3	93	97,5
Inflation rate %	4,4	4	3,7

\* Primary preliminary data

\*\* Forecasts

Source: The UAE Ministry of Planning, General Statistics Department. Annual Statistical Report, 1996. p. 23.

Doubtless, economic improvements as shown above positively effect the State's economic growth and also citizen's welfare, living standards (growing GDP per capita), life expectancy, education, etc. However, these improvements could not

divert our attention from the nature of the challenges imposed by the economic and social structure in the UAE. We have already partly discussed such challenges above and now we would like to focus on some of the most important of them.

## Economic challenges

### *Oil sector and unbalanced economic structure*

The pattern of economic development of the UAE still depends, to a greater extent, on oil and the oil sector, which is still the main generator of the state's GDP. This factor can be explained by the data as follows:

### Share of economic sectors in the GDP, 1993-1996 (current prices, in million Dirhams, %)

Sectors	1993	1994	1995	1996	Contribution %			
					1993	1994	1995	1996
Agriculture, animals & fish resources	3156	4158	4501	5052	2.4	2.9	2.9	2.9
Extraction industries > crude oil > others	47341	44558	47949	56900	35.5	31.4	30.6	32.7
	389	421	563	577	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4
Conversational industries	1140	14342	16345	17975	8.4	10.1	10.4	10.3
Electricity & water	2769	3010	3231	3467	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.0
Construction & building	12200	12411	13614	14491	9.2	8.7	8.7	8.3
Wholesale, retail & rehabilitation services	13776	15173	16088	17269	10.3	10.7	10.3	9.9
Reastaurants & hotels	1957	2098	2208	2396	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4
Transport, warehousing & communications	7923	8564	10537	11184	5.9	6.0	6.7	6.4
Financial institutions & insurance	6627	7672	8836	9750	5.0	5.4	5.6	5.6
Real estates & business services	10210	12977	15712	16861	7.7	9.1	10.0	9.7
Social & personal real estates	1647	2382	2531	2769	1.2	1.7	1.6	1.6
Less accounted for banking services	-2412	-2901	-3144	-3562	-1.8	-2.0	-2.0	-2.0
Government services	15588	15914	16780	17788	11.7	11.2	10.6	10.2
Domestic services	895	1130	1223	1283	7.0	8.0	8.0	7.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>133206</b>	<b>141909</b>	<b>156902</b>	<b>174200</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: U.E.A. Ministry of Economy & commerce, Indexes of economic sectors in UAE, 1993-1996, p. 23.

The data of above table show the following group of indications:

- A) The low shares of the Agriculture and animal resources sector in GDP as it does not exceed 2.9 per cent.
- B) The Oil sector is the major generator of the GDP as it forms about 32.7 per cent (1996).
- C) In spite of the endeavours made by the State to improve performance in the industrial sector with its share in GDP increasing from 8.4 per cent in 1993 to 10.3 per cent in 1996, the share of the industrial sector is still below the required level. We think that there is a necessity to diversify national revenue sources as well as to free the country from "the oil dependant development tunnel", an aim which will never be achieved without a strong industrial sector.

*The labour market and foreign manpower*

It is possible to identify another type of challenges imposed by the UAE' economic structure and we mean namely the country's labour market. We have already mentioned that foreign manpower dominates most fields of economic activities in the UAE. The following table proves this fact. The data are for the Abu Dhabi Emirate, which is the largest in the UAE, a main generator of the UAE's GDP and also the main contributor to the federal budget.

**Employees at local departments in Abu Dhabi Emirate by nationalities (1980-1995) with exception of daily paid workers**

Year	Employees							
	Nationals	%	Arabs	%	Foreigners	%	Total	%
1980	3739	17.6	9173	43.1	8375	39.3	21287	100.0
1985	5198	18.2	10423	36.5	12927	42.3	28548	100.0
1990	5970	19.0	11159	35.6	14251	45.4	31380	100.0
1991	6138	19.1	11362	35.2	14744	45.7	32244	100.0
1992	6118	18.6	11474	34.8	15366	46.6	32958	100.0
1993	6291	18.2	11995	34.7	16236	47.1	34522	100.0
1994	6639	18.0	13065	35.3	17267	46.7	36971	100.0
1995	6887	17.6	13781	35.1	18540	47.3	39208	100.0

Source: Crown prince Dewan, Researches & Studies Department. UAE Development Indicators, Achievements & Expectations, 1996, p. 94 (percentages accounted by researcher).

Details of the above table are a good example illustrating the fact of the dominance of expatriate manpower (Arab and foreigners) in most economic fields in the country. The point we would like to stress here is that the national economy will never be able to develop and remain strong without the participation and efforts of the national citizens.

## **Social challenges**

The unique nature of the UAE's demographic structure has been explained in previous parts of this study, namely the imbalance between the sizes of the national and foreign populations. The result is that national citizens became a minority in the UAE. Moreover, the serious problem in this respect is that national citizens suffer from spreading of phenomena of social diseases among them, which constitutes a hazard to the stability of the social structure and consequently a hazard to the State's political, economic and social security. We will focus our attention on the most significant phenomena threatening the social security in the UAE: drug abuse, juvenile delinquency and family disintegration.

### *The drug abuse phenomenon*

Drug abuse is dangerous to the individuals and society as it exhausts the capabilities of the both, additionally having negative impacts on ethical and behavioural standards. It is proved that drug abuse increases the rate of crime and delinquency and also family disintegration, the matter that consequently lowers the productivity rates of individuals and the whole society. This is the reason why we think that this phenomenon is one of the most dangerous in terms of destroying the social, economic and family structures in society.

The next table shows extension of this phenomenon in the UAE.

## Statistical data on drug crimes by the Emirates in 1996

	Abu Dhabi	Dubai	Sharjah	Ajman	Um Al Quwain	Ras Al Khaimah	Fujairah	Total
Drugs importation	12	18	11	-	1	5	-	47
Trading in drugs	6	25	17	1	-	1	-	50
Drugs taking	12	181	18	34	-	15	6	266
Glue sniffing	-	14	10	8	13	8	3	56
Others	-	-	26	-	-	-	2	28
Total	73	313	82	53	20	41	14	596

Source: Crown prince Dewan, Researches & Studies Department. UAE Development Indicators, Achievements & Expectations, 1996, p. 94 (percentages accounted by researcher).

The details of the above table reflect the following indications:

- Dubai Emirate is on the top place as to the drug crimes is concerned (52.5 per cent) and Sharjah is on the second place (13.8), while Abu Dhabi occupies the third place (12.2), Ajman fourth place (8.9) and Ras Al Khaimah the fifth (6.9).
- Drug abuse is the most frequent crime, as it constitutes 44.6 per cent of total drug crimes, while drug possession comes in second place (25 per cent).

The danger of this phenomenon to the social and economic structure of the society is aggravated by the fact that most individuals indulging in this respect are UAE' citizens as shown in the next table:

## Persons Involved In Drug Cases According To Nationalities & Purpose Of Acquisition In 1996

U.A.E.	269	44	-	13	90	17	446
Omani	12	4	1	9	8	3	37
Qatari	4	-	-	-	1	-	5
Bahraini	14	-	-	-	-	1	15
Kuwaiti	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
Saudi Arabian	5	2	-	-	-	4	11
Egyptian	10	1	1	3	-	-	15
Sudanese	8	2	-	-	1	-	11
Jordanian	1	2	-	-	-	-	3
Palestinian	-	1	1	-	-	-	2
Yemeni	1	-	-	1	1	-	3
Lebanese	3	1	-	-	-	-	4
Somali	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Iraqi	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Morocan	2	-	-	-	-	-	2
Syrian	3	-	-	2	-	-	5
Iranian	49	22	1	39	3	8	122
Pakistani	11	18	4	17	4	11	65
Bengali	-	-	-	-	7	-	7
Russian	2	1	-	1	-	2	6
Kazhstani	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Luthuanian	-	-	-	-	-	2	2
Ugandan	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
British	2	-	-	-	2	-	4
Uzbekstani	1	-	-	-	-	3	4
Indian	6	2	1	5	-	-	14
Beninnian	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Fijian	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Tanzanian	1	2	-	1	-	-	4
Filippini	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
Azerbaijani	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
American	4	-	-	-	-	-	4
Ukrainian	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Tadzhikistani	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Zanzibari	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Afganistanian	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Kenyan	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
Canadian	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
Ivory Coast Citizen	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Without Nationality	19	7	5	2	11	2	46
Total	437	111	27	96	128	55	854

Source: Ministry of Interior, Previous source, pp. 232-233.

The data of the above table show that the total number of arrested persons by nationalities consist of 39 nationalities (except national citizens) while the total number of persons arrested was 364 persons and the number of arrested national citizens was 446 persons, which is 52.2 per cent. This fact reveals the danger of the drug abuse phenomenon to the economic and social structure of the society.

### *Juvenile delinquency*

The juvenile delinquency phenomenon is no less dangerous than the drug abuse one and also constitutes a threat to the social and economic structure of the society. Furthermore, the juvenile delinquency threatens the future social and economic development of the society.



## Cases Of Arrested Juveniles According To Nationality, Profession, Gender, Age Group & Type Of Crime Throughout The Emirates

Emirate	No. Of Juveniles	Nationality			Profession			Gender		Age Groups		Type of Crime			Total
		National	Arab	Foreigner	Student	Employee	Unemployed	Male	Female	Below 10 years	More than 10 years	Against Persons	Against Assets	Various	
Abu Dhabi	322	195	96	31	232	56	34	312	10	9	313	128	138	56	322
Dubai	519	312	58	149	325	85	99	472	47	4	515	187	188	144	519
Sharjah	651	298	94		259	360	159	132	553	98	593	227	168	256	651
Ajman	219	42	49	128	137	8	74	159	60	46	193	44	40	135	219
Um Al Quwain	52	16	5	31	27	10	15	44	8	4	48	7	16	29	52
Ras Al Khaimah	188	95	27	66	112	42	34	174	14	14	180	44	76	68	188
Fujairah	69	61	2	6	24	12	33	69	-	-	69	19	45	5	69
<b>Total</b>	<b>2020</b>	<b>1019</b>	<b>331</b>	<b>670</b>	<b>1227</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>421</b>	<b>1783</b>	<b>237</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>1911</b>	<b>656</b>	<b>671</b>	<b>693</b>	<b>2020</b>

Source: Ministry of Interior, Previous Source, p. 267

In the light of the above data indications can be summarise as follows:

- A) Sharjah Emirate tops the list in terms of the total juveniles arrested throughout the country (32.2 per cent), while Dubai Emirate is second with 25.7 per cent. Abu Dhabi Emirate is the third (15.9 per cent), Ajman Emirate is fourth (10.8), Ras Al Khaimah Emirate is fifth (9.3), while Fujairah and Urn Al Quwain Emirates are on the sixth and seventh places (4.3 respectively 2.6).
- B) More than half of the juveniles arrested were national juveniles (50.44 per cent) with Dubai Emirate at the top of list (30.6), while Sharjah Emirate is the second with 29.2 and Abu Dhabi Emirate with 19.1 per cent of the total juveniles arrested.
- C) The juvenile delinquency phenomenon is becoming a serious danger, especially if we take into consideration the following facts:
  - Most of the crimes committed by national juveniles included theft (42.9 per cent) and assault (39.8). These types of crimes form 82.7 percent of the overall crimes committed by national juveniles.
  - The majority of national juveniles who committed crimes (97.2 per cent) are aged over ten years and 96.9 per cent of them are males.
  - The majority of national juveniles who committed crimes (72 per cent) are pupils and students.

The above indicators confirm the seriousness of the juvenile delinquency phenomenon as it constitutes a threat to the future social and economic stability in the society affecting the political and social security of the State.

### *Family disintegration*

We identified the two most significant social phenomena which threaten the UAE's social and economic security. Another phenomenon, which is no less dangerous than drug abuse and juvenile delinquency, is family disintegration. All three phenomena are closely intertwined, as it is possible to say that family disintegration leads to drug abuse and juvenile delinquency as well. This is also confirmed by the fact that the majority of drug takers and delinquent juveniles came from disintegrated families.

We think that the best indicator showing the process of family disintegration is the divorce rate, which documents the nature of family disintegration and functional disorder of the family.

**Divorce certificates registered by courts in the United Arab Emirates (1988 - 1993)**

Emirate	Divorce certificates					
	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Abu Dhabi	967	903	862	824	1129	930
Dubai	400	406	387	436	373	478
Sharjah	367	432	429	408	480	326
Ajman	60	84	55	105	127	153
Um Al Quuwai	28	000	10	35	37	20
Ras Al Khaimah	36	33	22	11	12	63
Fujairah	79	63	97	57	75	51
Total	1937	1921	1832	1876	2233	2121

Source: UAE Ministry of Planning, Central Statistics Department, Annual Statistical Series, Nineteenth Edition. 1994, p. 64.

The data of the above table show the following indications:

- Increased number of the divorce cases in UAE during period of 1988 - 1993 as it went up from 1937 cases in 1988 to 2121 cases in 1993.
- The lowest divorce rate was registered in 1990 if take the period of 1988 - 1993.
- Abu Dhabi is the Emirate with the highest divorce rate in the UAE within the period of 1988 –1993. In 1993 the number of divorce cases in the Abu Dhabi Emirate was 930, following by Dubai Emirate (23.5 per cent) and Sharjah Emirate with 20.1 per cent.

The seriousness of the divorce rate indicator can be better understood when we compare divorce rates among national citizens and foreigners in the UAE as it is shown below:

Nationality	National citizens		Foreigners		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Emirate						
Abu Dhabi	591	63.5	339	36.5	950	100.0
Dubai	260	54.4	218	45.6	478	100.0
Sharjah	294	60.0	132	40.0	426	100.0
Ajman	93	60.8	60	39.2	153	100.0
Um Al Quuwai	16	80.0	4	20.0	20	100.0
Ras Al Khaimah	50	79.4	13	20.6	36	100.0
Fujairah	42	82.3	9	17.7	51	100.0
Total	1346	63.5	775	36.5	2121	

Source: UAE Ministry of Planning, op. cit., Schedule No. 37, p. 66 (percentage accounted by author)

The data of the above table show the following indications:

- A general increase of divorce rates among national citizens even in Emirates with the lowest divorce rates. For example, Fujairah Emirate registered 51 divorce cases in 1993 out of which 42 cases were divorces of national citizens (82.3 per cent). Um Al Quwain Emirate registered in the same year 20 divorce cases out of which 16 cases were among national citizens (80 per cent of the total divorce cases). Ras Al Khaimah Emirate registered 63 divorce cases out of which 50 cases (79.4 per cent) were of national citizens. It should be underlined that the percentages for other Emirates were much higher. The divorce rate of national citizens in Abu Dhabi Emirate was 63.5 per cent of total divorce cases registered by Emirate's courts, while the rate in Ajman Emirate was 60.8, Sharjah Emirate 60 and 54.4 in Dubai Emirate.
- If we take the total number of divorce cases in the UAE in 1993, the ratio of divorce cases between national citizens and foreigners was 63.5 per cent to 36.5 per cent in favour of national citizens.

The facts mentioned above illustrate the nature of the challenges imposed by the economic and social structure, which the UAE faces at present and will face in coming years. Aiming to improve the political and social security of the state, the UAE's authorities should develop policies on how to solve these issues and make the state more safe, secure and stable.

### **3. Designed elements of the United Arab Emirates' national strategy**

We have already pointed out some methods on how to enhance the effectiveness and competence of political institutions dealing with political security. Now, we would like to propose certain strategies which could restrict the seriousness of the above mentioned challenges imposed by the social and economic structure of UAE society.

#### **Economic policies**

- A) Adoption of a national program on diversification of the national revenue resources aiming to enhance the industrial sectors and help the country to exit from the "oil dependent development tunnel."
- B) Adoption of a national program on food security with the aim of enforcing agriculture sector so the share of this sector in the country's GDP will be significantly increased. The country's food security is without doubt a fundamental factor of political and social security.
- C) Adoption of a national investment plan with aim to encourage the flow of national capital into various development areas and programs.
- D) Adoption of a national job program aiming to support participation of national citizens in the economic and business activities as well as to equilibrate the labour market between foreign and national manpower.

#### **Social policies**

- A) Adoption of a national training program for citizens with the aim of educating them on how to protect natural resources and minimise loss rate.
- B) Adoption of a national training program for citizens with the aim of improving their job skills and also increasing the productivity of national labour.
- C) Adoption of a national anti-drug program combating drug abuses, drug related crimes, supporting work with the addicts, state information and educational agencies highlighting the hazards and consequences of this phenomenon for individuals and society as a whole.
- D) Adoption of a national family program with the aim of enhancing the integrity of the UAE family, which will decrease the number of divorces and consequently the rate of juvenile delinquency.

In conclusion, it has to be stressed that the proposed policies could be effective and successful provided that they will be implemented within an integrated state strategy aiming to improve political and social security in the UAE and also secure a sustainable societal development.

## IV. Conclusion

### *(Issues and queries about the future)*

We tried in this study to address issues related to the political and social security of the United Arab Emirates. We attempted to map the most important external and internal security challenges, the special nature of domestic, regional and international conditions, effects of the Second Gulf War on the security agenda in the region and in the UAE. And finally, we tried to design and propose some basic components of the state's national strategy aiming to improve political and social security of the UAE. In conclusion, we would like to summarise the results of this study:

1. Political security cannot be achieved apart from social and economic security, as both are two sides of one coin. Political sovereignty is not achievable without strong economic and social structures supporting the independent political decision making by the state's authorities.
2. Political and social security requires a balanced attitude as there is a need to confront simultaneously external and internal security challenges and the last are not less important than the first. Moreover, we think that stable and solid internal political, economic and social structures are the first precondition for successfully resisting external security threats.
3. The relation between the political, social and economic security of the State and external affiliation is reciprocal. Openness to the external world is a necessity imposed by the modern international system. Nevertheless, this must be in the interest of national independence.
4. Political and social security cannot be achieved by applying only the military method of security. Although military force is important for the State, it cannot solely achieve political and social security. Therefore, we point out the following:
5. The societal or cultural method is most optimal for achieving political and social security. It is the method, which is capable of equilibrating the military, political, economic and social aspects of security. Moreover, this is method, which allows advancing sustainable development of the society.

We have drawn up the basic elements of the UAE national strategy aiming to improve the political and social security of the country at the present and also for the

future. We would like to summarise here the main questions concerning the future of the UAE's security as it is on the verge of the next century. The most important questions are as follows:

### *Identity and culture*

The significance of this question originates from the actual social and cultural challenges the UAE faces at the beginning of the twenty first century. Doubtless, political and social security is intertwined with restoration of the national and cultural identity of the society. The UAE society will not be able to restore its national and cultural identity without being able to confront the challenges imposed by the nature of its demographic structure and to remedy the defect caused by the imbalance between foreign residents and national citizens. The consequent of this deformation is also an unbalanced labour market in which foreign manpower dominates.

### *Political independence*

The significance of this question originates from the fact that political and social security cannot be reachable without enhancement of the state's political independence as the relation between the political and social security and foreign subordination is antithetical.

### *"The oil dependent development tunnel"*

The significance of this question originates from the fact that political and social security cannot be guaranteed without establishment of a strong national economy and diversification of national revenue sources. The perspective of a stable national economy or national revenue could not depend on a perishable resource like oil and petroleum, but it could be based on an industrial sector.

### *Human development*

The significance of this question originates from the fact that human development constitutes the main pillar which facilitates achievement of political and social security on the one hand, and it is a main goal of security policies on the other. Human beings or national citizens constitute the development tool and target of security policies, while at the same time they are the main consumers of the results of a comprehensive security policy provided that it is successfully implemented.



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